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CODIFYING COMMONSENSE: RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS AND THE FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS THEY PROTECT
The Supreme Court has held that a student’s right to free
speech warrants protection and, thus, is not shed at the
schoolhouse doors. Students whose religious viewpoints are
discriminated against at school are likely unaware of their
constitutional
rights.
The
Religious
Viewpoints
Antidiscrimination Act or Student Religious Liberties Act—
passed in Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas—
aims to protect students’ right to free speech. The Acts reaffirm
constitutionally protected rights to free speech in classroom
assignments, homework, and other interactions while at school.
The Acts also advocate for the establishment of a limited
public forum at all school-sponsored events where students may
speak. This policy ensures both that students can speak at any
school-sponsored event without fear of discrimination and that
schools do not run afoul of the Establishment Clause’s
proscriptions. The Acts pass scrutiny under both the Lemon test
and the endorsement test and are, therefore, constitutionally
sound. The Acts promote a policy that protects students’ free
speech rights, including the right of religious expression, and
provide teachers and administrators with a clear policy that
will prevent costly litigation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a fifth-grader in Tennessee was told by her teacher to
write about whomever the student admired most, she was told
that she could not write about God. In Texas, a group of
cheerleaders were banned from holding banners mentioning
Christ at a football game. A South Carolina Valedictorian
offered the Lord’s Prayer during graduation despite a recent
ban on the use of prayer at high school graduations. A Texas
Valedictorian decided to attribute his success to Christ while
speaking at graduation and quickly had his microphone turned
off by school officials. All of these stories reveal a problem with
161
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student religious expression in public schools. The problem
most typically arises when a student speaks about religion in
school; because of its perceived influence or impact on other
students, the student is silenced. While it would be unwise to
label, at least in all cases, this censorship the result of hate or
maliciousness, it is rooted in a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the United States Constitution. Teachers and
school officials are not properly instructed on students’ free
speech rights and, therefore, choose to err in favor of no
expression in order to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause.
In an effort to protect students’ free speech rights,
legislation was passed in Texas, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and most recently Tennessee. The legislation is known as the
Student Religious Liberties Act (“SRLA”) or Religious
Viewpoint Anti-discrimination Act (“RVAA”) [hereinafter “the
Act(s)”
or
“the
Antidiscrimination
Act(s)”].
The
Antidiscrimination Acts provide guidance on student speech in
schools and especially in school-sponsored events such as
graduation, pep rallies, assemblies, and sporting events. The
Acts reinforce teachers’ and administrators’ understanding of
students’ freedom of speech rights in classwork, homework,
private conversation, and particularly in school-sponsored
events where students may speak.
The Antidiscrimination Acts call for the creation of limited
public forums for all school-sponsored events. These forums are
the key to understanding how students can express themselves
at school-sponsored
activities
without violating
the
Establishment Clause. The Acts, in many aspects, were drafted
with recent Supreme Court decisions on school-sponsored
prayer and other related issues in mind. This is evidenced in at
least three major ways. First, the Antidiscrimination Acts do
not have a religious purpose or effect, do not inhibit or advance
religion, and do not cause entanglement between the
government and students. Next, the Acts do not endorse
religion; they merely seek to protect students’ viewpoint
expressions and facilitate the expressions regardless of
whether they are religious or irreligious. Finally, when a
student speaks at a school-sponsored event, the Acts do not
encourage or facilitate coercion. While critics argue that the
Acts might erode the constitutionally mandated separation of
church and state, the Acts provide much needed protection of

5.Riches.PubEdit.161-189 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/22/16 11:53 AM

RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT ANTIDISCRIMINATION

163

free speech rights and policy direction.
This Comment advances a commonsense argument that
will discuss the Acts and the relevant Supreme Court cases.
These discussions include free speech and Establishment
Clause cases (Part I); why the Antidiscrimination Acts are
needed to protect the freedom of speech in schools (Part II);
how the Acts avoid violating the Establishment Clause (Part
III); and, lastly, policy suggestions on application of the Acts
(Part IV).
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Problem of Viewpoint Discrimination in Schools

Students’ free speech rights, particularly students’ rights to
religious speech and expression, are violated regularly while at
school. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
contains two important clauses, known commonly as the
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses.1 Respectively, these
clauses state that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion” and “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”2 While these rights should be
afforded to all citizens, enforcing the proscriptions of the
Establishment Clause has increasingly been given greater
priority, especially in public schools.3 The following two
examples serve as illustrations of violations of students’ rights
to free speech under a misguided application of the
Establishment Clause.
In East Texas, Kountze Independent School District
officials ordered that high school cheerleaders stop displaying
banners containing religious messages and bible verses.4 The
school administrator claimed that the messages violated the
Establishment Clause.5 Parents soon filed suit complaining of
free speech and free exercise violations.6 The suit recently
1

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
3
Fear of Establishment Clause violations have left administrators and teachers
without a practical understanding of the extent to which that right and the Free
Exercise right interact.
4
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2014 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4951, at *3–5 (Tex. App. Beaumont May 8, 2014).
5
Id. at *5.
6
Id.
2
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made it to the Court of Appeals of Texas, where the Court
simply deemed the case moot because the litigated issues had
been resolved.7 The Court found that the school district had
changed its policy to the following: “Based on the evidence,
including oral and written testimony, submitted to the Board,
the Board concludes that school personnel are not required to
prohibit messages on school banners, including run-through
banners, that display fleeting expressions of community
sentiment solely because the source or origin of such messages
is religious.”8
The court concluded its opinion, noting that the school
district had made the necessary changes to the policy so that
the cheerleaders could utilize religious speech on the banners.9
The school changed the policy about seven months after the
complaint was filed.10
Another case, Rusk v. Crestview Local School District, arose
in response to a school’s practice of distributing flyers to
students through mailboxes.11 Claiming it violated the
Establishment Clause, a parent brought suit to challenge the
practice of distributing flyers that made reference religious
activities or that contained religious messages.12 The lower
court concurred with the parent, finding that this practice
violated the Establishment Clause and issuing a permanent
injunction against the school.13
On appeal, however, the court found that the policy did not
offend the Establishment Clause and addressed the appellee’s
contention that the school was endorsing religion.14 The court
stated, “[N]o reasonable observer could conclude that by
distributing the flyers at issue here, Crestview is endorsing
religion.”15 The court also addressed the “‘heightened concerns’
about the impressionability of elementary school students”
stemming from Supreme Court precedent.16 However, the court
reasoned that “the [Supreme] Court has never ruled that a
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *12.
379 F.3d 418, 419 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 424.
379 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
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school’s practice might amount to an impermissible
endorsement of religion because of the impressionability of the
school’s young students.”17
These examples demonstrate schools’ inability to correctly
construe and apply the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause. The ensuing result is costly litigation and violation of
students’ rights to free speech. Had Antidiscrimination Acts
and better policies been in place, the constitutional rights of
religious expression for the above-mentioned students’ might
never have been infringed and litigation might have been
avoided.
B.

Statutory Provisions and Policy Assessment of the
Antidiscrimination Acts

The Antidiscrimination Acts have been adopted in at least
four states: Texas (2007), South Carolina (2010), Mississippi
(2013), and, most recently, Tennessee (2014).18 The Acts vary
slightly from state to state, but carry the same broad
antidiscrimination message.19 While the titles of the
Antidiscrimination Acts specifically mention religious
expressions, the spirit of the Acts encompasses all expressions,
religious or secular. Though not necessarily presented in this
particular order, there are four main provisions in each of the
Acts, discussed below in turn.20
1. Students’ right to free speech
The first part of the Acts state, in pertinent part, that “[a]
school district shall treat a student’s voluntary expression . . .
in the same manner the district treats a student’s voluntary
expression of a secular or other viewpoint on an otherwise
permissible subject and may not discriminate against the

17

Id.
TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 25.151-.157 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-435, 59-1441, 59-1-442 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-3–12-15 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
49-6-1801–05 (2014).
19
Tennessee’s RVAA includes “promotes illegal drug use” under the
Establishment of a limited public forum section. Id. § 49-6-1803. Additionally, the
states vary on whether the schools must or may adopt a policy that establishes a
limited public forum. Texas and Mississippi require that schools adopt a policy that
requires the establishment of a limited public forum at all events where students will
speak. These two states also include a model policy as part of the statute.
20
See supra note 18.
18
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student based on a religious viewpoint . . . .”21 The
Representative that sponsored the Tennessee bill repeatedly
referred to this as a way to “level the playing field.”22 In this
way, the Acts are not meant to place a student’s religious
speech above another’s secular speech, but rather both are
afforded equal protection.
2. Students’ right to free speech in assignments
Next, the Antidiscrimination Acts protect students’
expressions in classwork and homework. The Acts state,
“Students may express their written beliefs about religion in
homework, artwork, and other written and oral assignments
free from discrimination based on the religious content.”23
Additionally,
students’
“[h]omework
and
classroom
assignments shall be judged by ordinary academic standards of
substance and relevance and against other legitimate academic
concerns . . . [and] [s]tudents may not be penalized or rewarded
based on the religious content of [their] work.”24 In light of the
anecdote related above (i.e., where, in an assignment to write
about a person the student admired most, a fifth grader in
Tennessee was forbidden from writing about God), this
provision has more than proved its need.25
3. Students have the freedom to organize groups
The third provision of the Antidiscrimination Acts states
that “students in public schools may pray or engage in religious
activities or expressions before, during and after the school day
in the same manner and to the same extent that students may
engage in nonreligious activities or expressions. It continues,
“[s]tudents may organize prayer groups, religious clubs . . . or
other religious gatherings before, during and after school to the
same extent that students are permitted to organize other
noncurricular student activities and groups.”26 Additionally, the
21

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.151 (2013).
H.B.1547,
108th
Gen.
Assembly
(Tn.
2014),
available
at
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/108/Bill/HB1547.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
23
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1804 (2014).
24
Id.
25
Suzi Parker, Will Tennessee’s New Religious Viewpoints Legislation Protect
Bullying in School?, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/tennesseesreligious-viewpoints-legislation-protect-bullying-school-010041312.html.
26
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-7 (2014).
22
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Acts allow for any religious group to advertise its events to the
same extent as any secular group.27
4. The establishment of limited public forums for schoolsponsored events
The final part of the Acts deals with the establishment of a
limited public forum whenever students are speaking publicly
at school events.28 This provision protects both the school and
the student. The school is protected because the policy should
“eliminate any actual or perceived affirmative school
sponsorship or attribution to the [school] of a student’s
expression of a religious viewpoint.”29 The main concern under
the Establishment Clause when a student expresses religious
sentiments publicly is whether the school supported that
expression in an official capacity.
To protect both the students and the school, the school
should: (1) establish a forum that does not discriminate against
a student’s voluntary expression; (2) select student speakers
using neutral criteria;30 (3) limit the subject matter so that
obscene, vulgar, offensively lewd, indecent or promoting of
illegal drug use is prohibited;31 and (4) read and sign a
disclaimer that removes the school’s hand from the speech.32
Both the Mississippi and Texas Legislatures codified a
model policy with the Act.33 The model policy provides further
details on the use of the limited public forum at both
graduation events and non-graduation events.34
5. Policy assessment and suggestions
While the First Amendment right to free speech is well
27

TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2014).
Id. at § 1803.
29
Id.
30
Both the Texas and Mississippi statutes include several examples of neutral
criteria. See TEX EDUC. CODE §§ 25.151-.157 (2013); MISS CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-3 to -15
(2014).
31
This specifically differs from statute to statute. Tennessee’s refers to drug use
while the other three do not. Still, all the schools have the right and responsibility to
make sure that students are not misusing the forum and can do so without
discriminating against their religious viewpoints.
32
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803 (2014); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9
(2014).
33
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(5); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.156 (2013).
34
Id.
28
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established, the provisions of the Antidiscrimination Acts help
school administrators and teachers promote rather than
prevent those rights in public schools.35 Opponents to the Acts
argue that an increase in litigation will result because schools
will try to facilitate more religious speech.36 However, the
passage of time has largely eroded and discredited this
argument, since—in the months and years following the
passage of the Acts—hardly any litigation has been brought on
the Acts. In fact, since its passage in 2007, the courts have only
mentioned the Act once.37 Moreover, since Texas originally
enacted the Act, at least three other states have adopted
similar Acts, further supporting the notion that additional
litigation is not likely a concern.
Another issue arises after the legislature enacts the law
and schools must begin to apply the new policy. School
districts, including administrators, teachers, and additional
staff, will likely need training on the updated policies.
Finally, to ensure that students’ rights are protected, every
state that adopts the Acts should require—rather than merely
suggest—the establishment of a limited public forum. Doing
this will, as mentioned above, protect students and schools.
C.

Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court has not ruled or made any statements
regarding the various state Antidiscrimination Acts. As a
result, it is impossible to say—with certainty—how (or if) the
Acts fit within recognized First Amendment jurisprudence.
However, the Court’s past decisions as to Free Speech and the
Establishment Clause provide insight into how the Acts could
be validly put into practice. Therefore, this Comment will
discuss and consider the results and analysis of the Court in
the prominent Free Speech and Establishment Clause cases.
1. Cases where free speech is protected and viewpoint
35
Symposium, The Texas Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act and the
Establishment Clause, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 939, 1021 (2009).
36
Id.; see also Sarah Posner, Using Texas’ model, more states mull ‘religious
viewpoints’
in
schools
law,
ALJAZEERA
(April
24,
2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/24/religion-expressionschools.html (“When
the [RVAA] passed in 2007 [speaking about the Texas Statute] ‘we were certain it
would lead to lawsuits rather than prevent them . . . .’”).
37
Symposium, supra note 35, at 1022; see also Does 1-7 v. Round Rock Indep.
Sch. Dist., 540 F. Supp. 2d 735, 744 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
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discrimination discouraged
The First Amendment guarantees certain free speech rights
to adults, but do schoolchildren retain these rights while at
school? The simple answer is yes. However, the Supreme Court
has provided several restrictions on free speech in schools.
a. Tinker and the protection of free speech in public schools.
The first free speech case to provide clear direction on
students’ rights in school was Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.38 The Supreme Court
ruled seven to two that the First Amendment freedom of
speech protection applied to schoolchildren.39 The majority
famously stated, “It can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”40 Protesting the
then ongoing conflict in Vietnam, a group of adults and
students decided to wear black armbands.41 The school
responded to the plan and adopted a policy against wearing the
armband.42 After the students wore the armbands anyway and
were suspended for violation of the policy, the students filed
suit.43
The Court’s decision marked a new standard for student
speech at school.44 The Court protected student speech that did
not “materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.”45 The Court was, however, sensitive to the fact that
schools are not a typical public forum for speech and that
normal free speech standards do not always apply within
schools as they do elsewhere.46
Several cases that followed Tinker established various
restrictions on free speech in schools.47 These include: Bethel
38

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id.
40
Id. at 506.
41
Id. at 504.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 503.
45
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
46
Id. at 506–07, 509; see also Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School
Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 663 (2009).
47
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (establishing that the
39
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School District No. 403 v. Fraser,48 Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,49 and Morse v. Frederick.50
b. Free speech protected again under Rosenberger despite
religious content.
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia.51 The case came to the
Court as an Establishment Clause case but left as a free speech
case.52 A University of Virginia student decided to produce a
publication through his organization, Wide Awake Productions
(“WAP”).53 The organization qualified as a Contracted
Independent Organization (“CIO”) at the school and therefore
was eligible to submit funding requests for a student
publication.54 The Student Activities Fund (“SAF”) denied
WAP’s request for funding and the University denied further
recourse.55 The SAF claimed that the publication was
considered “religious activity” and, therefore, was ineligible for
publication funding.56
In the judicial proceedings that followed, both the district
court and the court of appeals found that the University had a
compelling interest in maintaining separation of church and
state and, therefore, upheld the University’s decision.57
However, the Supreme Court found that the Establishment
Clause concerns were not sufficient in this case to justify the
school could limit lewd or profane language at school-sponsored activities); Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (providing additional restraints on
printed material that bore the school’s name and endorsement); Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393 (2007) (establishing additional limits on drug promotion and endorsement
in school speech).
48
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 678 (concluding that the school should balance a student’s
right “to advocate unpopular and controversial views in school” and the school’s
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”).
49
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260 (reversing and drawing a line between the
school’s toleration of speech and the promotion of speech.).
50
Morse, 551 U.S. at 393 (finding that the speech was not protected under the
First Amendment because of the unique problems schools face in combatting drug use.
Though Morse restricted student speech, the majority made a point to emphasize that
students’ right to free speech in schools under Tinker remains mostly intact.).
51
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 825.
54
Id. at 826–27.
55
Id. at 827.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 827–28.
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SAF’s viewpoint discrimination against the petitioner’s
publication.58 The court observed that the distinction between
content
discrimination
(permissible)
and
viewpoint
discrimination (impermissible) “is not a precise one.”59 The
Court continued, “[T]o cast disapproval on particular
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech
and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s
intellectual life.”60 The Court made the point that a “sweeping
restriction on student thought” would go beyond the
University’s ability to effectually regulate which students the
School would fund for publication.61
As a result, the Court held that the school’s limit on the
student’s speech was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
The majority stated that “[w]hen the government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a
subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more
blatant.”62
2. The Establishment Clause in schools
The Supreme Court’s decisions in this section show a
pattern of protecting students’ speech when the appropriate
forum exists and when the school has successfully separated
itself from the speech.
a. Mergens and the Equal Access Act.
The Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to the
Equal Access Act (“EAA”) in 1990 in Board of Education v.
Mergens.63 Bridget Mergens attempted to establish a Christian
club at her high school, but her request was denied because—
as the school claimed—such an organization would violate the
Establishment Clause.64 Later, after the suit was filed in
district court, Mergens argued that the refusal to allow the club
violated the EAA.65 Under the EAA, a school that receives

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 835, 839.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id. at 829.
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
Id. at 233.
Id.
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federal aid and “maintain[s] a limited open forum” would be
subject to the EAA.66 The school argued that it was not
operating a limited public forum since it only allowed
“curriculum-related” clubs to organize.67 Since this term is
fairly ambiguous, the Court sought to provide further
clarification.68 As a result, the Court determined that
“curriculum-related” clubs are “any student group that . . .
relate[s] to the body of courses offered by the school.”69
Since the school allowed clubs that did not fall under this
definition, the school had established a limited public forum for
student clubs.70 The Court also rejected the notion that
allowing the club would violate the Establishment Clause and
argued that the EAA has the secular purpose of preventing
discrimination against religious and other types of
speech.71Justice O’Connor relied on the Court’s decision in
Widmar v. Vincent, stating, “an open-forum policy including
nondiscrimination against religious speech would have a
secular purpose and would in fact avoid entanglement with
religion.”72
b. The lack of a limited public forum in Lee and Santa Fe and
the students’ loss of protection.
The Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman found that this
particular school’s policy and practice regarding prayer at
graduation violated the Establishment Clause.73 The 1992 case
involved a school policy that allowed the school administration
to dictate who gave the prayers and what language the prayers
would include. The Court found that the policy violated the
Establishment Clause because the government was coercing
individuals “to support or participate in religion or its exercise,
or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or
66

Id.
Id.
68
Id. at 238.
69
Id. at 239.
70
Id. at 247.
71
Id. at 248.
72
Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice O’Connor also said—speaking of secondary school students—
“[they] are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse
or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Id. at
250.
73
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
67
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religious faith, or tends to do so.’”74 The Court felt that prayer
at graduation was coercive because of the captive audience.
The Court recognized the significance of the event and that
many students, though not required, would feel obligated to
attend the graduation ceremonies.75 The Court stated that the
“prayers bore the imprint of the state and thus put school-age
children who objected in an untenable position.”76
Eight years after Lee, the Court ruled on Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, another school prayer
case.77 In this case, the school’s policy allowed students to vote
on (1) whether there would be a prayer at football games and
(2) who would give the prayers.78 The school administration
assumed that—because it had turned the process over to the
students—that it would avoid the problems raised in Lee.
However, the Court recognized the “crucial difference between
government
speech
endorsing
religion,
which
the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect.”79 In this case, the state’s involvement in the creation
and carrying out of the policy fell into the former category of
government speech endorsing religion.
The Court made it clear that the First Amendment did not
ban all religious expression in public schools.80 In fact, the
Court stated that “nothing in the Constitution .†.†. prohibits
any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time
before, during, or after the schoolday.”81
c. How the limited public forum in Rosenberger avoided
violating the Establishment Clause.
A second aspect of the aforementioned Rosenberger case—
which revolved around whether there was viewpoint
discrimination in denying a student, religiously affiliated
74

Id. at 587.
Id. at 586. The majority rejected the argument that the graduation was
voluntary and said that the graduation ceremony was, “in a fair and real sense
obligatory.” Id.
76
Id. at 590.
77
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
78
Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
79
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990)).
80
Id. at 313.
81
Id.
75
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publication funding—deals with the concept of a limited public
forum. Even though the university had created a forum for
such expression, it was concerned that printing religious
content would violate the Establishment Clause.82 The majority
in Rosenberger stated, “It does not violate the Establishment
Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on
a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups . .
. .”83 Further, “[t]here is no difference in logic or principle, and
no difference of constitutional significance, between a school
using its funds to operate a facility to which students have
access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to operate
the facility on its behalf.”84 The Court acknowledged the
university’s concern, but suggested that the university was
sufficiently separated from the student publications to avoid
any claims of endorsement.85
Finally, the Court detailed the constitutional standard
governing a school’s decision to grant or restrict access to a
limited public forum.86 Whereas a school or other state entity
may establish a forum where it may “preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is dedicated,”87 it cannot
exclude speech where its distinction is not “reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum,”88 nor may it discriminate
against speech on the basis of its viewpoint.89

82

The Court stated, “Government neutrality is apparent in the State’s overall
scheme in a further meaningful respect. The program (University) respects the critical
difference ‘between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect.’” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250)).
83
Id. at 842.
84
Id. at 843.
85
Id. at 844 (“By paying outside printers, the University in fact attains a further
degree of separation from the student publication, for it avoids the duties of
supervision, escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and replacement attributable to
student use, and has a clear record of costs.”). The Court continued to point out that
the money, therefore, was not attributable to tax payers but to the SAF, avoiding any
direct financial support from the State. Id.
86
Id. at 829.
87
Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch., 508 U.S. 384,
390 (1993)).
88
Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
804–06 (1985)).
89
Id. (quoting Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392–93).
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d. Good News Club and the protection of free speech and equal
access through a limited public forum.
The Supreme Court ruled on Good News Club v. Milford
Central School in 2001.90 This case revolved around the use of
school property for a club meeting where religious activities
took place. The school district restricted the use of the school
property “by any individual or organization for religious
purposes.”91 The main question before the Court was whether
the limited public forum that was established should allow
religious content.92 The School’s policy allowed groups to use
the facilities as long as the events related to the “welfare of the
community” and contributed to the “development of character
and morals from a religious perspective.”93 However, the school
did not allow groups to give “religious instruction” or engage in
activities that were “religious in nature.”94 The Court found, as
it did in Rosenberger, that this was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.95
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOLS
A.

Recent Disturbing Patterns of Viewpoint Discrimination in
Schools

Students’ right to free speech—particularly religious
speech—is under attack and the need for stronger policies
protecting students has never been greater. The following are
real examples from across the country where students’ free
speech rights were in danger of violation.
In New York, an intermediary school “indefinitely
suspended a student for wearing rosary beads for religious
reasons in violation of a dress code. The student sued, and after
the court issued an injunction, the case was settled, with the
school clearing the student’s record and paying nearly $25,000

90

533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Id. at 103.
92
Id. at 108.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 109. The majority stated, “[I]t is not clear whether a State’s interest in
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination.”
Id. at 113.
91
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in damages, fees, and costs.”96
Another example occurred in Hawaii where parents were
invited “to include messages to their children in the yearbook
but [the school] refused to include one parent’s encouraging
Bible quote. The principal ultimately agreed to include the
Bible quote in the yearbook.97
A third example comes from Indiana where a principal did
not allow a “student to pass out religious flyers to other
students that contained . . . e-mail address[es] and website[s]
where students could submit prayer requests, although other
students had been allowed to pass out flyers with secular
content. The superintendent ultimately granted approval for
the student to pass out the religious flyers.”98
These examples illustrate that schools—acting to ensure a
separation of church and state is observed—have infringed the
free speech rights of schoolchildren on countless occasions. The
trend is likely to continue. Enactors of the Antidiscrimination
Acts, like the RVAA, have sought to statutorily protect
children’s rights to religious expression. While only four states
have adopted this legislation, it is the Author’s hope that more
states will enact similar protections in the near future.
B.

The Court Recognizes the Importance of Free Speech Rights
for Students in Public Schools

The freedom of speech is a fundamental right and should be
protected in schools.99 As illustrated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence on this matter, public school attendees share
most of the same free speech rights that normal citizens enjoy,
with only minor differences.100 However, since the current
public school atmosphere has become hostile toward religious
expressions, the Antidiscrimination Acts are critical to
protecting these rights.
96
Jay Alan Sekulow, Religious Liberty and Expression Under Attack: Restoring
America’s First Freedoms, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/religious-liberty-and-expressionunder-attack-restoring-americas-first-freedoms#_ftn36.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
100
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. Justice Fortas argues, “It can hardly be argued that
either teachers or students shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years.” Id. at 506.
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1. The importance of protecting student speech in general
The Court’s decision in Tinker established broad speech
rights for students not engaged in school-sponsored activities.101
Though later cases have suggested some restrictions on student
speech rights, the Court has consistently maintained and
reaffirmed the fundamental free speech rights that students
have while in school.102 The Court’s analysis in Tinker included
two considerations. First, the Court noted that the speech did
not disrupt normal school activities.103 Second, the Court was
perturbed that the school sought to limit a particular message,
in essence attempting to discriminate against a viewpoint.104
These considerations show that the Court desired to protect
free speech without unduly burdening the school in fulfilling its
intended purpose of providing education.
In later cases, the Court sought to emphasize these rights
and suggested that “permissible restrictions on student speech
are the exceptions, not the rule.”105 Indeed, the decision in
Morse established a general balancing test between (1) the
nature of the speech restriction, (2) the type of speech involved
and (3) the strength of the asserted school interest.106
Though the body of Supreme Court jurisprudence has made
clear that the First Amendment protects religious speech, the
use of such speech in schools—for some—remains an open
question. While, unquestionably, schools must respect the
Establishment Clause, they may not trample upon free speech.
101

Id. at 505.
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685 (ruling that lewd or profane language was not
protected by First Amendment); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (ruling that the school
could restrict sensitive material in student publication); Morse, 551 U.S. at 397
(holding that school could restrict speech that promoted drug use).
103
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09. The Court continued to say that the speech did
not involve “disruptive action or even group demonstrations” but was only “a silent,
passive expression of opinion” which was “akin to pure speech.” Id. at 508.
104
Id. at 510–11. “Thus, Tinker tailored its analysis and holding to the problem
of viewpoint discrimination, saying that viewpoint restrictions on student speech are
constitutionally permissible only when necessary to avoid a substantial interference
with the operation of a school or when the speech would invade the rights of other
students.” Cordes, supra note 46, at 663.
105
Cordes, supra note 46, at 674. See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“But I do not read the opinion to mean that there are necessarily any
grounds for such regulation that are not already recognized in the holdings of this
Court.”) (speaking of Tinker, Hazelwood, and Bethel). Justice Alito goes on to say that
the majority does not provide any further justifications for speech restrictions in
schools. Id.
106
Id. at 395.
102
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Justice Kennedy, in Rosenberger, aptly stated, “More than once
have we rejected the position that the Establishment Clause
even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free
speech rights to religious speakers who participate in broadreaching government programs neutral in design.”107 Public
schools are not exempt. The Court’s analysis in Tinker
emphasizes the protection of speech, including religious speech,
in schools.
2. Establishing a limited public forum protects students’ free
speech rights
Particularly when students speak at school-sponsored
events, a limited public forum would protect students’ free
speech rights and would protect the administration against
Establishment Clause violations. Such a forum would ensure
that student speech at school-sponsored activities is considered
private speech and not government speech.108 A limited public
forum differs from a typical public forum in that the entity
establishing the forum can control subject matter. Subject
matter restrictions typically take the form of broad rules about
what can be said but do not affect the speaker’s ability to
express viewpoints.
Viewpoint discrimination is never permissible in any forum,
especially one that has been opened up for expression. In
Rosenberger, the Court stated,
In determining whether the State is acting to preserve the
limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a
class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction
between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible
if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and . . .
viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible
when directed against speech . . . .109

The Court has recognized only a few categorical restrictions
on student speech at school-sponsored events, including using
profane and crude speech or encouraging drug use.110 However,
107

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
The Court stated, “We have held . . . that an individual’s contribution to a
government-created forum was not government speech.” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302
(citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819).
109
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
110
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 680. The Court determined that the school had a
legitimate interest in regulating the speech since it was crude and graphic. Id. at 689;
108
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the decisions in both Lee and Santa Fe demonstrate that
students’ rights are not the only critical aspect to consider. In
both of those cases the Court did not restrict students’ rights to
free speech, but rather the policies that the school had
established to govern the speech.111 And while the school may
not endorse or entangle itself with religious activities at these
sorts of events, students still retain free speech rights,
including the right to religious expression, when they speak at
such an event.112
The Rosenberger Court differed because the University’s
policy was directly in line with the Constitution. The majority
stated, “The University has taken pains to disassociate itself
from the private speech involved in this case.”113 Furthermore,
it argued that a limited public forum must protect viewpoint
expressions once a forum has been established.114 While
viewpoint cannot be restrained once a forum has been
established, subject matter may be regulated.115 Viewpoints are
typically considered “[the] substantive content or the message .
. . convey[ed].”116 The Court’s analysis, though directed at a
university, is applicable to high schools and potentially
elementary schools since these too are organizations sponsored
or run by the government, in addition to being places of
learning and development.117 In Rosenberger, the Court
protected speech in a metaphysical forum where the school
funded printing costs.118 The Court looked at any involvement

see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
111
Lee, 505 U.S. at 577; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
112
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
113
Id. at 841.
114
Id. at 839.
115
Id. at 828–29.
116
Id. at 828; see also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosly, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
117
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836. The Court says, speaking of universities, “to
cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free
speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life .
. . .” See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in
Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647, 655 (2005) (arguing that “students will try to
assert their developing religious and political identity by a variety of methods, many of
which we call speech.”) The author continues, “if schools silence such self-assertion
without good reason . . . [then] Tinker [and arguably Rosenberger] can . . . be viewed as
protecting a student’s right to push back . . . for the purpose of maintaining or
developing identity free from state interference.” Id.
118
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. Again, another logical extension of the Court’s
analysis here is beneficial. While the Court is deciding the case based on a
“metaphysical” forum, the forum analysis applies just as aptly to schools. Id.
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the school may have with the publications that it provided
funds to and determined that there was no evidence to suggest
that the school endorsed the publications.119
C.

Antidiscrimination Acts Protect Students’ Free Speech
Rights

The Antidiscrimination Acts encourage schools to adopt a
policy that would protect basic free speech rights.
Discrimination against free speech is unlikely a result of
bigotry or hate, but rather it arises as a result of teachers’ and
administrators’ lack of knowledge and expertise regarding
First Amendment rights. The Acts seek to provide that
knowledge to teachers and administrators.
1. The right to voluntary religious expressions in general and
in classwork or homework
Students have the general right to freely express their
views while at school.120 The Antidiscrimination Acts state that
“a school district shall treat a student’s voluntary expression of
a religious viewpoint . . . in the same manner the district treats
a student’s voluntary expression of a secular or other viewpoint
on an otherwise permissible subject.”121
Students also have the right to express themselves in a
similar manner in all classwork and homework assignments.
The Acts state that students may express their written beliefs
about religion in homework, artwork, and other written and
oral assignments free from discrimination based on the
religious content of the student’s submissions.122 Teachers and
administrators have the right to judge a student’s work under
“ordinary academic standards.”123
2. The right to organize religious groups and to receive equal
access
Students also have the right to organize religious groups
and to meet on school property to the same extent other non-

119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 841–45.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.151 (2013).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1804 (2014).
Id.
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academic groups organize and meet.124 After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Widmar v. Vincent, Congress passed the
Equal Access Act in 1984.125 In essence the Equal Access Act
and the Antidiscrimination Acts accomplish a similar goal:
preventing discrimination based on religious content. The Acts
state that “students may organize religious student groups,
religious clubs, ‘see you at the pole’ gatherings, or other
religious gatherings before, during, and after school to the
same extent that students are permitted to organize other
noncurricular student activities and groups.”126
3. The acts’ policy of establishing limited public forums for
school events will foster students’ free expression and protect the
school
The Antidiscrimination Acts suggest the establishment of a
limited public forum for school-sponsored activities, which, in
turn, protects both students’ free speech rights and the
administration from Establishment Clause violations. The Acts
also encourage a forum “that does not discriminate against a
student’s voluntary expression of a religious viewpoint on an
otherwise permissible subject.”127 Further, the Acts encourage
the school to establish subject matter restrictions in the forum
against any “obscene, vulgar, offensively lewd, or indecent
speech.”128
The school may require that the speech relate to the event
for which they are speaking. For example, school
administrators may ask graduation speakers to limit their
speech to graduation-related subject matter. If the event is a
pep-rally, the school may wish that the student speakers
restrict their remarks to those subjects related to winning,
school spirit, sports, etc.
The Antidiscrimination Acts provide a framework for a
limited public forum similar to the one approved by the Court
in Rosenberger, wherein student speech is protected and the
124
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (holding that the Equal Access Act is constitutional
and does not violate the Establishment Clause).
125
Symposium, supra note 35, at 970.
126
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2014).
127
MISS. ANN. CODE § 37-12-9(1)(a) (2014).
128
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.152(a)(3) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1-441(B) (2013);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(1)(c) (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803(b)(3) (2014).
Tennessee’s Act includes “promotes illegal drug use” in the list of restricted speech.
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school is not considered to be endorsing the speech. To help
disassociate student speech from the school, the Acts suggest
that schools “[s]tate, in writing or orally, or both, that the
student’s speech does not reflect the endorsement, sponsorship,
position, or expression of the [school].”129 Additionally, two of
the Acts provide a model policy that schools can reference when
establishing their own policy.130
All high schools currently have student speakers for
graduation and in many cases for other school-sponsored
events. When the school allows the students to speak, the
school is understandably concerned about violating the
Establishment Clause. However, “[m]ore than once [the
Supreme Court has] rejected the position that the
Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a
refusal to extend free speech rights to religious speakers who
participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral in
design.”131 The Antidiscrimination Acts will provide policy and
practices that protect the First Amendment rights of students
whilst simultaneously protecting schools from any claims
that—by allowing such speech—its has violated the
Establishment Clause.
IV. ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Antidiscrimination Acts protect free speech without
drastically increasing the chances of Establishment Clause
violations. The Supreme Court has determined that there are
several ways to violate the Establishment Clause. Most of
these are listed below along with explanations on how the Acts
do not violate this constitutional provision.
A.

Antidiscrimination Acts Pass the Lemon Test

In the 1971 Lemon v. Kurtzman case, the Supreme Court
struck, as unconstitutional, two state statutes, which provided
supplemental funding to teachers at church-related educational
institutions.132 The Court applied what is now known as the
129
130
131
132

TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1803(b)(4) (2014).
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.156 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-12-9(5) (2013).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).

5.Riches.PubEdit.161-189 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/22/16 11:53 AM

RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT ANTIDISCRIMINATION

183

Lemon test, which provides that to pass constitutional muster a
statute must (1) have a secular legislative purpose; (2) be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) does not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.133
The Court found both that the legislature had a secular
purpose when it passed the statute and that the statute’s
principal effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion, but
found that the statute raised Establishment Clause concerns as
to the third prong: government entanglement.134 While the
Court acknowledged that complete separation between church
and state is not absolute, it determined the entanglement was
excessive after examining the (1) character and purposes of the
institutions that it benefitted, (2) the nature of the aid that the
State provided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority.135
1. Protection of free speech is a secular purpose
The Antidiscrimination Acts protect student free speech,
which is a secular purpose under the Lemon test.136 While the
Acts reach beyond religious speech, they do specifically provide
for the protection of the same.137 Critics of the Acts have argued
that, because the legislation is deliberately aimed at protecting
religious speech, the Acts could be invalidated under the
Establishment Clause.138 Indeed, at least one opponent of the
Acts has suggested that the Acts could be ruled
unconstitutional under the Lemon test’s purpose prong,139
especially given the fact that certain legislators that passed the
Texas and Tennessee Acts expressed their interests in
protecting religious speech. This, the critic argues, supports the
notion that the Acts have a religiously motivated purpose.
However, as mentioned in Board of Education v. Mergens, a
subjectively religious motivation on the part of the legislature
133

Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 614–15.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 663. “Our cases also recognize that legislation having a secular purpose
and extending governmental assistance to sectarian schools in the performance of their
secular functions does not constitute “law[s] respecting an establishment of religion”
forbidden by the First Amendment merely because a secular program may incidentally
benefit a church in fulfilling its religious mission.” Id.
137
See supra note 18.
138
Symposium, supra note 35, at 977–78.
139
Id. at 1018.
134
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“alone would not invalidate [a statute], because what is
relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the
possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the
law.”140 Thus, the critic only hints at the idea that the Acts
would be unconstitutional because, the fact is, the protection of
religious speech is a secular purpose.141
2. The acts neither inhibit nor advance religion in schools but
simply protect free speech
Instead of seeking to advance or inhibit religion, the
Antidiscrimination Acts pass the second prong of Lemon
because they protect the accommodation of religion.142 In Cutter
v. Wilkinson, speaking about the relationship between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Supreme Court found
that “there is room for play in the joints between the
Clauses.”143 Justice Thomas argued that under both the first
and the second prong of Lemon, “[a] discredited test,” “any
accommodation of religion – might well violate the
[Establishment] Clause.”144 Clearly the Antidiscrimination Acts
would not fail both the first and second prongs of the Lemon
test simply because they protect a religious policy, an
important point in Cutter.145
3. Protection of free speech reduces government entanglement
with religious speakers
Finally, the Antidiscrimination Acts do not bring about any
serious entanglement issues with the state. The third prong of
the Lemon test requires more in-depth analysis because it
deals with the actual implementation of the Acts.146 In Agostini
v. Felton, the Court stated, “[n]ot all entanglements . . . have
140

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249.
Symposium, supra note 35, at 1019; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 731 (2005) (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not mandate complete
legislative avoidance of religion but merely prohibits Congress from making laws
establishing religion); see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
142
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
143
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719. Justice Ginsburg continues, “Our decisions recognize
that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between the Clauses, some space for legislative
action neither compelled by the free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.” Id.
144
Id. at 726 n.1.
145
Id. at 709.
146
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
141

5.Riches.PubEdit.161-189 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/22/16 11:53 AM

RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT ANTIDISCRIMINATION

185

the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction
between church and state is inevitable . . . [and] must be
‘excessive’ before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.”147
The Court in Lemon found that the statutes in question
involved excessive entanglement and as a result would violate
the Establishment Clause.148 Also, in Agostini the Court found
that the “pervasive monitoring by public authorities” of the
activities of religious organizations caused excessive
entanglement.149 The Antidiscrimination Acts will not require
any pervasive monitoring by the state beyond the normal
interactions that happen in public schools currently.150 The Acts
will simply codify existing First Amendment rights.151
Additionally, in Lemon, the Court compared the present
case to previous cases where the state provided “secular,
neutral, nonideological services, facilities, or materials.”152 The
Court had no problem with the state providing these materials
because the “potential for involving some aspect of faith or
morals in secular subjects, a textbook’s content is
ascertainable, but a teacher’s handling of a subject is not.”153
Therefore, when compared to the materials, funding a teacher
would cause the state to face a significantly greater risk.
Teachers, however, can be regulated through workplace rules
or regulations. Though schoolchildren may pose additional
risks, schoolchildren are drastically different because they are
not state employees or state funded. While a child’s “handling
of a subject” (i.e., speaking at a school-sponsored event) may
also be indeterminable, the Acts do not fund student speech
and as a result do not require the state to pervasively monitor
the speech.154
B.

Creation of Limited Public Fora in Which Religious Speech
May Occur Is Consistent with the Establishment Clause

Establishing a limited public forum at all school-sponsored
events where students speak will help avoid Establishment
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
See supra note 18.
Id.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 617.
Id.; see also supra note 18.
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Clause violations and—equally as important—will protect free
speech rights. Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe v. Doe, two
important Supreme Court cases, are prime examples of schoolled prayers, where a limited public forum may have been
beneficial.155
In Weisman, the school traditionally had a policy that
allowed the school to invite ministers of various sects to pray at
the school’s graduation ceremony.156 The Court questioned
whether that policy violated the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.157 The Court
concluded, “[t]hese dominant facts mark and control the
confines of our decision: State officials direct the performance
of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation
ceremonies for secondary schools.”158 Additionally, the Court
addressed the concern that attending the graduation ceremony
became “participation in a state-sponsored religious activity”
that felt “in a fair and real sense obligatory.”159
In Santa Fe, the Court was presented with a similar
concern at a different venue, a high school football game.160 As
in Weisman, Santa Fe was a fact-intensive case where the
school administration had established prayer policies.161 In
Santa Fe, the school attempted to make the speech attributable
to students by establishing an election process.162 However, the
Court found that, as in Weisman, the school’s involvement in
the prayer created the Establishment Clause concern.163
The Antidiscrimination Acts escape the first problem of
school-directed prayer with ease.164 They suggest the use of a
limited public forum and require the student speaker to either
orally or in writing waive the school of liability for involvement
in the speech.165 The Acts would protect prayer-like speech in
the context of a graduation ceremony where a student chose to

155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Lee, 505 U.S. at 577; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 90.
Id. at 296–99.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Symposium, supra note 35, at 999; See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 25.152 (2013).
Id.
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express religious speech within the bounds of the forum.166 In
the end, the graduation attendees in Weisman and those
attending a school in a state with these Antidiscrimination
Acts may hear similar speech; the crucial difference is the lack
of endorsement and state involvement.167
1. A limited public forum for individual student speech does
not endorse religion
While opponents of the Antidiscrimination Acts argue that
this type of legislation would deteriorate the Establishment
Clause
and
ultimately
cause
discrimination,
the
Antidiscrimination Acts protect against discrimination and
help prevent Establishment Clause violations.168 The
endorsement test, originally used in Lynch v. Donnelly, asked
whether a reasonable observer would find that the state’s
purpose or effect was to endorse or inhibit religion.169 The
endorsement test largely centers around two principles from
the Lemon test, the purpose and effect prongs.170 The Lynch
Court did not find endorsement of religion because the purpose
and effect of including a Nativity scene in an annual Christmas
display were both secular.171
Similarly, in schools, the Antidiscrimination Acts do not
endorse or inhibit religion. The purpose and effect are both
secular. The Court in Lynch made it clear that “[t]he effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of the state’s actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval.”172 While the Antidiscrimination
Acts may protect religious speech, they do not convey a
message of endorsement. The Acts clearly state that any
religious speech should be treated “in the same manner in
which the [school] treats a student’s voluntary expression of a
secular or other viewpoint on an otherwise permissible subject .

166

Id.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 609; see also Symposium, supra note 35, at 999.
168
Symposium, supra note 35, at 978; See also, letter from ACLU to TN Governor
Bill Haslam available at http://www.aclu-tn.org/pdfs/ACLU-TN%20RVAA%20Veto%20
Letter.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
169
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
170
Id. at 690–92.
171
Id. at 685, 694.
172
Id. at 690.
167
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2. A limited public forum protects student speech and does not
coerce participation in school-sponsored speech
While students are not forced to attend all school events
such as graduation, pep rallies, and sporting events, the
Supreme Court has expressed concern that students will feel
obligated or pressured to attend to the point where the event is
considered mandatory.174 The limited public forum, suggested
by the Antidiscrimination Acts, addresses this concern.175 As
discussed above, once the state has established a forum for
student speech, the state cannot discriminate against a
viewpoint expression.176
The coercion problem, addressed in Lee v. Weisman,
involved a school that was organizing prayer at graduation
ceremonies. The school officials were the catalysts for the
prayer. The Court made it clear, that “[s]tate’s involvement in
the school prayers . . . violates these central principles” of the
Establishment Clause.177 Removing the school’s hand in the
speech would also remove any problems with coercion.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the seven years since the Antidiscrimination Act was
first passed in Texas, at least five other states have considered
similar legislation and three others have enacted their own
versions of the Act. The antagonistic attitude toward religious
free speech in public schools has not improved since 2007. This
Comment has shown that school districts can adopt and
implement the Antidiscrimination Acts without violating the
central tenants of the Establishment Clause.
The Acts successfully protect student speech in (1) in-class
voluntary expressions, (2) expressions in homework/school

173

TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1802 (2014).
The Court pointed out that even though most students have the choice to
attend the football game, others are required, such as the band, cheerleaders, and the
athletes. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–95; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311–12.
175
See supra note 18.
176
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
177
The state’s participation in the planning of the prayer was at the heart of the
decision to remove the prayer. Nothing in this decision suggests that students in a
limited public forum could not express their religious viewpoints. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
174
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assignments, (3) and group speech settings through the
establishment of a limited public forum (which provides
protection for both the school and the student). By establishing
a limited public forum, not only will students’ rights be
protected, but also schools can avoid the pitfalls of an
Establishment Clause violation if and when a student shares a
religious viewpoint.
The Acts effectively address real areas of concern for
students and schools. Students that are discriminated against
or simply restricted from sharing views because of their
religious content have recourse in the First Amendment.
Unfortunately, those students may not be afforded the
protection they deserve. The Acts, with accompanying policies,
if enacted in more states and adopted by schools, will protect
students and schools in preventing burdensome litigation,
prohibiting
unwarranted
discrimination,
and,
most
importantly, ensuring that the First Amendment rights of
students
are
guaranteed.
Adopting
legislation
that
accomplishes these aims is simply commonsense.
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